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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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1 OF 1

4 FEB 1970

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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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4 February 1970
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FBIS TRENDS
4 FEBRUARY 1970

CONTENTS

Topics and Events Given Major Attention 3

VIETNAM WEEKLY REVIEW

Introduction	1
Paris Talks: 29 January Session	3
President Nixon's 30 January Press Conference	5
Moscow on President's Statements	5
U.S. "Attacks" Against the DRV	6
Vietnam Workers Party 40th Anniversary	8
PRG Council of Ministers Meeting	12
Military Developments in the South	13
"Crimes" in the South	13

MIDDLE EAST

Moscow Continues to Express Hope for Political Settlement	15
USSR Says Arabs "Effectively" Countering Israeli Attacks	18
Chcu Message to Nasir Pledges PRC Support for Arabs	19

STRATEGIC ARMS

Moscow Continues Attacks on ABM's, Softpedals SALT Issues	22
---------------------------------------------------------------------	----

SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

Peking Comment on State of Union Address Avoids Issues	24
------------------------------------------------------------------	----

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Peking Assails Soviet Leaders as Moscow Polemics Abate	25
Central Asian Military District Holds First Party Conference	25

PRC AND NORTH KOREA

Peking Publicizes Sino-Korean Border Navigation Talks	28
-----------------------------------------------------------------	----

COMMUNIST CHINA

Kwangtung Province Takes Lead in CCP Reconstruction	29
---------------------------------------------------------------	----

USSR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Moscow Frontpages Political Demise of Dubcek and Cernik	30
-------------------------------------------------------------------	----

ROMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA

Bucharest Disclaims "Nationalism," Defends Ties With West	32
Yugoslav Commentator Assails Limited Sovereignty Doctrine	33

CONFIDENTIAL

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4 FEBRUARY 1970

- 1 -

TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 26 JANUARY - 1 FEBRUARY 1970

<u>Moscow (3710 items)</u>			<u>Peking (2892 items)</u>		
Czechoslovakia	(1%)	10%	Domestic Issues	(49%)	43%
[Czech CP Plenum	(--)	6%]	6th Anniversary of	(--)	15%
[Parliamentary	(0.1%)	3%]	Mao Statement on		
Delegation in			Japanese People's		
USSR			Struggles		
Vietnam	(4%)	7%	Middle East	(3%)	3%
[Soviet-DRV	(--)	4%]	Anniversary of	(--)	2%
Relations			January 1969		
Anniversary			Czechoslovak		
India's 20th	(1%)	5%	Riots		
Anniversary					
Criticism of China	(7%)	4%			
Middle East	(3%)	4%			
Asia-Africa Solidarity	(0.2%)	4%			
Conference in Moscow					

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
4 FEBRUARY 1970

- 1 -

VIETNAM WEEKLY REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

The pervasive Vietnamese communist demand for a rapid and unconditional U.S. troop withdrawal is repeated by First Secretary Le Duan in his speech at a "grand meeting" in Hanoi marking the 40th anniversary of the Vietnam Workers Party (3 February). Reiterating that the Vietnamese "ardently aspire" to peace in independence and freedom, the First Secretary says: "So long as the United States is still unwilling to bring home rapidly and unconditionally all its expeditionary troops, all of President Nixon's statements about peace are merely deceitful and are intended to mislead public opinion in the United States and the world."

Le Duan does not mention the Paris talks or speak of reaching a negotiated settlement of the current conflict. Instead he prefaces the criticism of the President with a passage recalling that Ho Chi Minh's last will and testament had declared that the Vietnamese "must be resolved to fight against the U.S. aggressors until total victory." In tracing the history of the Vietnamese resistance struggle Le Duan recalls that temporary accommodations were reached with the French and the Chinese Nationalists in the 1946 period, but it is impossible to determine from the speech what his motives were or how these remarks may relate to future policy.

Le Duan declares that the VWP, "acting upon the sacred testament of President Ho," continues to do its best to contribute to the restoration of "fraternal party" unity. He adds that "we continue consolidating and strengthening the unshakable solidarity between us and the Soviet Union, China, and all the fraternal countries in the socialist camp." Peking takes the occasion of the party anniversary to level an attack on Soviet Vietnam policy, couched in vitriolic terms last used in the Chinese leaders' message on the occasion of DRV National Day on 1 September, only days before Ho's death. The PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 3d says that the Soviet "renegade clique" has always colluded with U.S. imperialism "in a vain attempt to undermine the Vietnamese people's war," and it adds that Brezhnev "and his ilk" are worse than Khrushchev in this regard. Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress, in a broadcast in Mandarin on the same day, attacks the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial as being full of "blatant anti-Soviet concoctions" about Soviet Vietnam policy. It points out that the CCP Central Committee message on the VWP anniversary "dared not" repeat PEOPLE'S DAILY "lies" because the Vietnamese people would "not condone" such libel.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
4 FEBRUARY 1970

- 2 -

Further high-level Vietnamese communist denunciation of U.S. policy is voiced by Le Duc Tho upon his arrival in Paris on the 30th to head the VWP delegation to the 19th French Communist Party Congress.* Reporting his arrival, VNA on the 2d notes that he denounced the Nixon Administration for its "double-dealing trick" of paying lip service to peace while carrying out its Vietnamization plan aimed at prolonging the war. VNA says nothing about Le Duc Tho's position as a special adviser to the DRV delegation at the Paris talks when it reports that he called on the United States to immediately end its war of "aggression" and seriously negotiate. (This is Le Duc Tho's first return to Paris since his departure in early July 1969.) A brief Soviet report of his arrival in Moscow on 28 January does not indicate that he had discussions with Soviet leaders.**

Criticism of President Nixon's remarks on Vietnam in his State of the Union message is sustained at the 52d session of the Paris talks on 29 January, with both FRG Foreign Minister Mme. Binh and DRV delegate Ha Van Lau questioning his statement that the prospects for peace in Vietnam are greater today than they were a year ago. Vietnamese communist propaganda on the President's 30 January press conference says he "again tried to intimidate the Vietnamese people." And a NHAN DAN commentary on the 2d terms "deceitful" his comment that the U.S. goal is to end the war in Vietnam, preferably by negotiations as quickly as possible.

The 28 January incident in which the DRV claims the downing of three U.S. planes prompts a flurry of propaganda including a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's protest and a commendation from President Ton Duc Thang. The incident also got attention at the Paris session on 29 January, and a NHAN DAN article on the 31st rebuts Ambassador Habib's statement that the reconnaissance flights are in keeping with the understanding reached at the time of the November 1968 bombing halt. On 3 February the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman issues another protest, charging that U.S. planes "repeatedly strafed a number of populous areas in Bo Trach district, Quang Binh Province" on 2 February.

* The last French CP congress in January 1967 was attended by a delegation led by member of the Central Committee Secretariat Nguyen Van Tran. Le Duc Tho led a party delegation visiting France at the invitation of the French CP in August 1965 and has attended various East European party congresses in recent years.

** Tho normally has met with Kosygin on his trips through Moscow, but in November 1968 he was in Moscow for several days without being reported as meeting any leaders. Consistent with past practice, there is no report that Le Duc Tho stopped over in Peking.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
4 FEBRUARY 1970

- 3 -

Front media released a communique on a PRG Council of Ministers meeting, said to have been held in mid-January, which "reviewed all aspects" of the situation in 1969 and "worked out directives and tasks" for 1970. The communique does not mention the Paris talks but does say that "the struggle" has been stepped up in response to the NFLSV's 10 points and the 12-point PRG program of action. It adds that people in America and throughout the world are "struggling vigorously" against President Nixon's policy of prolonging the war through Vietnamization and against his "peace hoax." The communique says in standard fashion that because the Nixon Administration--far from withdrawing troops promptly and unconditionally--is seeking to draw out the war in the hope of consolidating the "puppets," the "people and armed forces" must further step up "their current general offensive and widespread uprising."

Both Hanoi and Front media continue to hail the four-day Tet cease-fire, which had been proclaimed on 5 January and will extend from 5 through 8 February. A Hanoi broadcast on 1 February recalls alleged allied violations of the Christmas cease-fire and calls on the people "to appropriately punish" any violations during Tet. A Liberation Radio commentary on the 3d predictably disparages the GVN's announcement of a 24-hour cease-fire for Tet.

PARIS TALKS: 29 JANUARY SESSION

At the 52d session of the Paris talks on 29 January both Mme. Binh and Ha Van Lau echoed earlier propaganda in questioning President Nixon's statement in his State of the Union message that prospects for peace are greater today than they were a year ago. Mme. Binh called this view "entirely contrary to the truth," and Lau commented that peace prospects are in fact "more remote" now, at a time when the Nixon Administration is downgrading the importance of the talks so as to subsequently "sabotage" them. The VNA account notes that Lau took issue with the President's statement that the major U.S. foreign policy goal is to end the war in Vietnam, saying that present U.S. policy in fact aims at prolonging the war. Mme. Binh made the usual points in scoring Vietnamization and the alleged U.S. intent to prolong the war. She also introduced into the conference record another instance of a "mass slaughter of civilians." This latest "atrociousness," involving the "massacre" of 700 civilians, is said to have occurred in three districts of My Tho Province during December 1969.

In the customary diatribe against the GVN, which she termed a "big obstacle" to a peaceful settlement, Mme. Binh noted that the U.S. and Saigon delegates at the previous session had raised "in unison" the "so-called" free elections proposals which "we have long rejected."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
4 FEBRUARY 1970

- 4 -

The PRG delegate again repeated the six-month troop withdrawal proposal, saying that once the United States accepts the principle of total and unconditional allied troop withdrawal from South Vietnam, "concrete" issues relating to this question may be discussed and settled in "a flexible and satisfactory way." She termed six months an "adequate" time frame for the United States to withdraw its forces "without any technical obstacles."

Both Mme. Binh and Ha Van Lau routinely urged the United States to respond "seriously" to the NFLSV 10-point solution. Mme. Binh added that the Nixon Administration "must enter into serious talks" with the PRG; she declared that the PRG, for its part, is ready "at any time" to talk directly with the United States on all issues related to ending the U.S. "aggressive" war.

ALLIED SPEECHES The VNA account says the U.S. and GVN delegates "rehashed" the idea of a mutual troop withdrawal which had "long been rejected" by the DRV and PRG delegates. The allied delegates, VNA adds, "continued to evade the two fundamental problems"--an unconditional pullout of all U.S. troops and troops of "the other foreign countries of the U.S. camp" and the formation of a provisional coalition government in South Vietnam. As for Ambassadors Habib's and Lam's statements, the VNA account says Habib repeated the "allegation that the United States would withdraw all its forces and replace them by South Vietnamese forces," while Lam also engaged in "ballyhoo about the readiness to release 62 North Vietnamese prisoners of war and renewed the proposal on elections advanced by Nguyen Van Thieu."

XUAN THUY INTERVIEW On the 29th VNA reports a UPI interview on the 26th with DRV chief delegate Xuan Thuy, who continues to boycott the sessions. In addition to drawing the usual contrast between U.S. "insincerity" and DRV-PRG "reasonableness" at the talks, Xuan Thuy is reported to have said that "for the moment" he intends to stay in Paris and that a return to the conference sessions "depends on the attitude of the United States." Thuy repeated the charge that the Nixon Administration has downgraded the talks and that "in the present situation, I don't believe there can be such an eventuality" of holding a private meeting with Ambassador Habib.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

4 FEBRUARY 1970

- 5 -

PRESIDENT NIXON'S 30 JANUARY PRESS CONFERENCE

In reporting President Nixon's 30 January press conference, VNA and LPA on the 31st claim that he again tried to "intimidate" the Vietnamese people, representing the President as saying "we have the means and we will be prepared to use those means more strongly than we have dealt with the situation in the past, if the Vietnamese people step up their struggle against aggression." A 2 February NHAN DAN commentary, carried the same day by Hanoi radio and VNA, observes that the President made an "insolent threat--an argument of pirates." The reports obscure the fact that President Nixon made his statement in assessing the possibility of a 1970 communist Tet offensive and that he referred to his 3 November statement in again reminding the other side not to put in jeopardy the remaining U.S. forces in South Vietnam at a time when the United States is withdrawing its forces and deescalating the fighting in Vietnam.

The NHAN DAN commentary questions the President's statement that the U.S. goal is to end the war in Vietnam preferably by negotiations and as quickly as possible. It terms this statement "deceitful," and it goes on to accuse the United States of being stubborn at the Paris talks and of slighting their importance by refusing to officially designate a new chief U.S. negotiator to replace Ambassador Lodge and by proposing restricted sessions. NHAN DAN also says President Nixon "tried to wage propaganda" for the Vietnamization plan and its implementation through the already announced troop reductions. The paper typically terms both Vietnamization and the U.S. troop reductions "tricks," consisting of Administration talk of withdrawing large numbers of forces while only withdrawing small numbers, and of trying to cope with a protesting public opinion.

NHAN DAN also notes that the President was asked about his hope to beat former Defense Secretary Clifford's timetable, asserting that President Nixon had said at his 19 June 1969 news conference that he would withdraw more forces by the end of the year than the 100,000 Clifford had proposed. According to NHAN DAN, the announced withdrawal of only 60,000 by the end of 1969 undermines the credibility of any of Mr. Nixon's statements on this matter.

MOSCOW ON PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS

Limited Moscow comment on President Nixon's comments on Vietnam in his 30 January press conference asserts that he said "nothing new," merely repeating that the United States intends to continue Vietnamization. Commentators again complain that the President gave no date for the withdrawal of troops. A broadcast in English to North America on 2 February notes that he was asked if his promise to beat former

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
4 FEBRUARY 1970

- 6 -

Secretary Clifford's timetable for troop withdrawal was still valid, but goes on to say only that the President's reply was "disappointing" and does not elaborate. There is no available Moscow acknowledgment of the President's warning that if the Vietnamese communists escalate the fighting the United States will deal with the situation "more strongly" than in the past.

Other comment criticizes the President's comment, in his State of the Union message, that prospects for peace in Vietnam are better than they were a year ago, a statement Moscow had ignored in its initial reaction to the speech. Some commentators, including Aleksey Leontyev in radio broadcasts and a TRUD International Review on 27 January, dispute the validity of the statement, pointing to the United States' unwillingness to withdraw its troops and its sabotage of the Paris talks as well as stepped-up fighting in the South.

U.S. "ATTACKS" AGAINST DRV

The 28 January incident in which U.S. aircraft were downed over the DRV has now prompted a spate of comment, including a 29 January DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's protest. The incident was reported promptly on the 28th when VNA claimed that the three downed planes brought the total to 3,331 and reported that the VPA High Command had issued a commendation for the feat. The foreign ministry protest claims that U.S. aircraft attacked populated areas in the western parts of Quang Binh and Ha Tinh provinces and that three U.S. aircraft were shot down* and "many others" damaged. The spokesman says the "new criminal acts" which followed alleged U.S. bombings on 13, 14, and 17 January "prove that the United States is continuing its acts of war" against the DRV, "brazenly" challenging public opinion.

The downings prompt a message of commendation from President Ton Duc Thang on behalf of the VWP Central Committee and DRV Government on the 30th, according to Hanoi radio on the same day. A 29 January QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial and a 31 January NHAN DAN article repeat the claim made in a 17 January war crimes communique that 12,000 reconnaissance sorties were flown over the DRV during the Nixon Administration's first year and that "more cynical still, they have sent fighter planes and even B-52's to bomb and strafe some areas in Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and Vinh Linh area." The papers charge that during the first 20 days of this year, U.S. planes have attacked Quang Binh and Vinh Linh on 19 occasions. Both papers and a 1 February DRV War Crimes Commission "special communique" assert that the incident

* A statement issued by the Pentagon and the U.S. command in Saigon on the 29th said an F-105 and a rescue helicopter had been downed in this area of the DRV.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

4 FEBRUARY 1970

- 7 -

constituted a "new and very serious act of war" by the United States, and the papers add that it "fully exposed the stubborn and warlike nature" of the Nixon Administration.

DISCUSSION Ha Van Lau at the Paris talks on 29 January in "additional
AT PARIS remarks" reported by VNA, said that the 28 January incident,
 occurring only a few days after President Nixon's boastful
speech about prospects for peace in Vietnam, "once again lays bare his
stubborn bellicosity and fallacious talk of peace." A 31 January NHAN DAN
article, as reported by VNA, charges that Ambassador Habib's remarks on
the incident at the Paris session on the 29th "were nothing less than
the arguments of a pirate." The paper acknowledges most of the substance
of Habib's remarks--to the effect that U.S. reconnaissance flights over
the DRV were to insure the safety of allied troops in the South, that
such flights were in keeping with the understanding reached at the time
of the November 1968 bombing halt, and that the DRV must bear full
responsibility for firing at U.S. planes.

The NHAN DAN article calls Habib's remarks "cynical contentions which
fully expose the bellicose and ugly nature" of the United States. It
ridicules the notion that the flights insure the safety of U.S.
troops, and it rejects the right of the United States to violate
DRV airspace without retaliatory action on the part of the DRV. It
goes on to declare that Habib's "allegation" that U.S. reconnaissance
planes fly over the DRV in line with the understanding reached earlier
is a "cynical and ridiculous contention." The "special communique" also
disparages the notion that the United States has the right to
reconnoitre the DRV and "strafe the latter when its piratical aircraft
are shot at," as well as the idea that the flights are in keeping with
the November 1968 bombing halt agreement.

NHAN DAN claims that the DRV "has time and again rejected the contention"
that an agreement was made, insisting that the bombing halt was
unconditional. It charges that early in 1969 President Nixon "several
times resorted to this contention" and that the "rehash of the
contention is further evidence of the U.S. stubborn attitude and
scheme to prolong the war." It then says routinely that as long as
U.S. planes violate DRV airspace, "well-deserved punishment will
be meted out."

Another NHAN DAN article on the 31st--broadcast by Hanoi radio the
same day--cites Western sources as saying that the United States
originally denied the incident but, "after clear proof had been
provided," admitted that it had lost "three aircraft" while "arrogantly"
stating that it had the right to reconnoitre the DRV and that escorting
aircraft had orders to return fire when fired upon.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
4 FEBRUARY 1970

- 8 -

MOSCOW, Moscow publicizes the alleged U.S. bombing of the DRV, TASS
PEKING promptly reporting the downing of U.S. planes on 28 January
and the air attack of 6 February, as well as the subsequent
DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statements, and the DRV war crimes
commission communique. Soviet media subsequently report statements
by State Department spokesman McCloskey that the United States continues
"spy flights" over the DRV and by the Pentagon and the U.S. Command
in Saigon "admitting" that the United States continues to bomb the
DRV. Moscow takes brief note of U.S. statements that continued bombing
does not mean a change of policy.

Peking on the 30th reports the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's protest
of the previous day. The same NCNA report notes that the VPA High
Command issued a communique commending the action.

VIETNAM WORKERS PARTY 40TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION

First Secretary Le Duan's appearance in connection with the celebrations
of the VWP's 40th anniversary and his address at the "grand meeting" in
Hanoi mark his first public appearance since a 4 December visit to
Hanoi work sites. However, an absence from public view for that length
of time is not unusual for Le Duan. Prominent in the activities
surrounding Ho's death, Le Duan had read the funeral oration and Ho's
testament on 9 September. He had also made some remarks on the
important issue of party tasks and unity at a cadre conference in the
An Thuy district of Haiphong, which Hanoi radio publicized on
31 October. (On 2 February Hanoi radio reports briefly that on the
preceding day Le Duan and Pham Van Dong, together with other party
officials, "joined 2,000 Hanoi youth in planting trees along the banks
of the Red River," inaugurating the spring tree planting drive in Hanoi.)

The account of the anniversary meeting lists all of the Politburo members
as attending except Le Duc Tho--who is in Paris for the French party
congress--and Pham Hung. The latter's last reported presence in
North Vietnam was at a reception on 29 September 1967 marking PRC
National Day. He was named as a member of Ho Chi Minh's funeral
committee but was not reported as attending any of the commemorative
functions.

PARTY HISTORY Although Le Duan expresses the usual sentiments about
"peace in independence and freedom" and labels
President Nixon's statements about peace "deceitful," he does not
address himself to the issue of a negotiated settlement of the current
conflict and does not mention the Paris talks. However, he does
recall, in the course of his outline of the party's history, an
instance of tactical flexibility and temporary accommodation with an
enemy.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

4 FEBRUARY 1970

- 9 -

Going back to the 1946 period, he notes that the party was faced with a dual threat from Nationalist Chinese forces and the French and that, in order to defend its gains, the party at one time advocated temporary reconciliation with the Chinese in order to cope with the French and at another time decided on temporary reconciliation with the French in order to deal with the Chinese and "the reactionaries and their henchmen" and to "gain time to consolidate forces in preparation for the nationwide resistance against the French which our party believed to be inevitable." He concludes this narrative by stating that "with an extremely clearsighted political line, maintaining firmness in principle and tactical flexibility, our party and President Ho skillfully steered the revolutionary boat out of the dangerous rapids, at first thought insurmountable."

The book "Forty Years of Activity of the Party," released to mark the anniversary and published in NHAN DAN, describes this period in similar fashion though in much greater detail.* It points out that the Central Committee decided at the end of 1945 to consider the French the main enemy and that the party advocated concessions to the Nationalists. When the French and Chinese signed an agreement on 23 February 1946, according to the history book, the party was faced with two alternatives: take up arms to prevent the introduction of French troops into North Vietnam and fight all enemies at one time, or "negotiate with the French, taking advantage of the contradictions among the imperialist countries in order to push the Chiang army out of the country and fight for a moderate period of time to consolidate and develop revolutionary forces and make practical preparations for the nationwide resistance." It states that the latter course was chosen and a preliminary agreement with the French signed on 6 March 1946 to establish the basis for negotiations, that discussions between the two parties began on 6 July 1946, and that Ho signed a modus vivendi with the French on 14 September.

The signing of the preliminary agreement, according to the book, was a "correct and enlightened position of our party" which enabled the "revolution" to expel the Nationalists and focus the struggle on the French and to gain time to prepare for the long resistance. Like Le Duan, the book praises Ho for leading the people through this difficult period.

* In his report to the third party congress in September 1960, Le Duan did not mention the accommodations in his brief review of the party's struggle.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

4 FEBRUARY 1970

- 10 -

Background: The 1946 period was also treated at length in a summary of a party history published in NHAN DAN in January 1965 on the occasion of the 35th party anniversary, although the maneuver of concessions first with the Chinese and then with the French was not so clearly spelled out and the alternatives facing the party in March 1946 were not stated.

The accommodations with the French are not always mentioned in briefer reviews of the party's history and have been the target of controversy in the past: In his reports to the second party congress in February 1951, Ho stated that "mention should be made of the preliminary agreement of 6 March 1946 and the modus vivendi of 14 September 1946 because they were considered as ultrarightist and caused much grumbling. But in the opinion of our comrades and compatriots in the South, they were correct."

CURRENT SITUATION In discussing the situation in the DRV, Le Duan recalls the growth in such areas as agriculture, industry, education, and medicine from 1954 to 1964. He admits that the people's material standard of living is still low and that they still have many difficulties.* But he claims that everyone is basically cared for materially, and that only socialism could have brought about such achievements. Declaring that these are only initial achievements, he urges the people to "carry out the immediate tasks with the highest and greatest results."

Le Duan echoes recent comment on production in stating that an imperative task at present is to "mobilize and make good use of all labor forces" and increase efficiency. Acknowledging that in many branches labor productivity is still low and manpower and material resources are being wasted, he repeats the view prevalent in DRV propaganda that it is necessary to improve organization and managerial work. And he recalls that Ho's testament recommended that a good plan for economic and cultural development be formulated with a view to raising the people's living standard.

In discussing the party, Le Duan points out that one of its responsibilities is to care for the life of the masses. He stresses the importance of ensuring the people's right to be collective master and in this context states: "we must resolutely punish the counterrevolutionaries and those who breach the socialist law or encroach on the interests of the people."

* Le Duan refers to "20,000,000" people in the North. However, the usual figure of 17,000,000 appears in other current propaganda, including the communique on the PRG Council of Ministers' January meeting.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

4 FEBRUARY 1970

- 11 -

He states that in order to increase its militant strength and leadership the party must "unceasingly be consolidated and built up in force and size to the highest degree," and he adds that it must strengthen its theoretical understanding. Predictably, he recalls Ho's words on the importance of unity within the party--"all comrades from the Central Committee down to the cell must preserve the unity and oneness of mind in the party." According to Le Duan, the immediate task in building the party is "to concentrate efforts on the consolidation and strengthening of party cells and local party organizations." He points to the need for party members to be dedicated, to mingle with the masses, and to be trained in ideology and virtue.

ANNIVERSARY VNA reports on 3 February that "all Hanoi dailies"
EDITORIALS carried editorials that day welcoming the party's 40th anniversary. The same item carries a brief version of the NHAN DAN editorial which indicates that it was routine in nature, stressing the leadership role of the party and the importance of unity in the party. On 3 February Hanoi radio broadcasts that day's QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial, which quotes Le Duan's assertion that "the urgent task of the revolution" is to defeat the United States, liberate the South, protect the North, and advance toward unifying the country. The editorial says the entire party, people, and armed forces are "determined to perseveringly step up the anti-U.S. national salvation resistance." While noting that there are still many difficulties and hardships" to be overcome, it describes the present situation as "more favorable than ever." But it asserts that "no matter what sacrifices and hardships we may have to endure and no matter how protracted and fierce our resistance may be, we remain determined to fulfill the glorious mission entrusted to us by history."

Although the editorial makes no mention of the Paris talks or current negotiations, it does declare that the party has always "closely combined political struggle with armed struggle and armed uprisings with the people's war Our party also has brought into full play highly flexible forms of coordinated struggle--namely, legal and semilegal struggle and economic and diplomatic struggle."

Declaring that the party's "political creativeness and thoroughness" have always been closely associated with its "ideological and organizational strength and firmness," the army paper says the party has "constantly formed a firm, stable bloc," maintained "solid unity," and upheld the principle of democratic centralism. Eulogizing Ho's role in creating the party, it says that he "strenuously trained for our party an outstanding, virtuous, and talented cadre corps. . . . He built our party into a unified, firm solidarity bloc." The party, he continues, is "more mature and stronger than ever. Headed by its Central Executive Committee--a collective of outstanding disciples and loyal comrades-in-arms of President Ho--our party possesses a numerous party-member and cadre corps which has been tested and has matured in struggle." The editorial thus echoes comment at the time of Ho's death which stressed that he had nurtured a corps of cadres and which called on everyone to maintain party unity.

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIG TRENDS
4 FEBRUARY 1970

- 12 -

PRG COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Front media on 29 January reveal that the Council of Ministers held a mid-January meeting, presided over by PRG President Huynh Tan Phat, to review accomplishments for the past year and set out tasks for 1970. There is no list of other individuals present, although the communique on the meeting says that representatives of the advisory council* also attended. In addition to the broadcast of the communique, which is dated 25 January, Liberation Radio later on the 29th also reports that the PRG Information and Culture Ministry held a press conference on the 27th at which the communique was made public. (The broadcast indicates that press organs represented included GIAI PHONG, LPA, QUAN GIAI PHONG, the Vietnam Alliance organ LIEN MINH, and the People's Revolutionary Party journal TIEN PHONG.)

Aside from the initial Council of Ministers meeting at the time the PRG was established in June 1969, the only other meetings known to have been publicized were on 22-23 July (reported by LPA on 2 August when the communique was carried),** and 20-21 August. The latter was reported by Liberation Radio on 14 November in a broadcast which said the meeting took the decision to make 6 June the official national day.

The communique on the recent Council of Ministers meeting echoes earlier year-end propaganda in claiming to have inflicted heavier casualties and material losses on the United States than in 1968. And it says that it is obvious that "the plan to prolong the war through the Vietnamization program, far from creating a position of strength much desired by Nixon, has only cost the United States more blood and money. . . ."

Outlining the tasks for 1970, the communique says that the leadership of the revolutionary administration must be strengthened at all levels. And it says the council decided to "enlarge and consolidate the system of the revolutionary administration" in order to further develop its function and insure the "people's democratic administration" as well as stepping up the social, educational, and medical tasks attributed to the revolutionary administration. Militarily the council calls for frustration of pacification and Vietnamization schemes and announces the start of an emulation movement.

* It thus is not known whether Nguyen Huu Tho, who holds the post of chairman of the advisory council, attended. Tho was not reported as being present at the 19 December meeting to celebrate the NFLSV anniversary. And his last reported appearance was on 22 November 1969 when he left Moscow after his tours which took him to Peking for Chinese National Day (1 October) and to Moscow for the October Revolution anniversary (7 November).

** Tran Buu Kiem reported on the Paris talks.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
4 FEBRUARY 1970

- 13 -

MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOUTH

On 29 January LPA reports a guerrilla attack on the 20th against a U.S. billet in Saigon, reportedly located in the second precinct. The news agency claims at least 50 Americans, mostly officers, were "wiped out." Two stories of the building were "blown down," says LPA, and two military depots destroyed. VNA on the 30th also reports the incident and summarizes a NHAN DAN article that day which reports other terrorist attacks in the city during January. The paper comments that even Saigon cannot be a sanctuary for the allies.

The NHAN DAN article on the 30th cites a battle in Rach Gia on the 22d, claiming that over 700 ARVN were wiped out, and that this proves the "gloomy prospects" of Vietnamization in the delta. The continued action in the highlands is mentioned in an LPA item on 1 February which says that 5,000 allied troops were wiped out in the area during the first two weeks in January, with U.S. Marines accounting for 600 of the casualties.

A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary of the 1st, broadcast that day by Hanoi radio, hails the downing of U.S. aircraft in 1970; no comprehensive statistics are cited. The commentary says that air force firepower is being used to increase the efficiency of clear-and-hold, limit allied casualties, and prop up the ARVN through Vietnamization, but that it is being dealt "heavy blows." The people are urged to reinforce their anti-aircraft network.

Action during January throughout the South is summarized by VNA in an item on the 3d which says that during "many battles" in the 20 days ending 22 January the PLAF put nearly 7,000 allied troops out of action. VNA asserts that the PLAF "broke off" a number of relief and pacification operations by the allies in "several key theatres" such as the delta and highlands.

"CRIMES" IN THE SOUTH

On the 31st Hanoi radio broadcasts a statement by the central Trung Bo NFLSV committee denouncing alleged crimes committed by the allies in Go Su, Quang Ngai Province, in October 1969. As part of pacification, the allies are said to have raided several villages, killing many people and sending others to Go Su "concentration camp." On 5 October, it charges, the Americans ordered Nguyen Hiep to poison those who demanded to be returned to their land, and within two days 197 had died. When others in the camp demanded indemnification, claims the statement, the allies shelled and machinegunned 21 others. Asserting that 300 were massacred at Go Su, the statement calls mass massacre an allied policy as well as a means of achieving their plans. It calls on the people to destroy "concentration camps" and crush pacification. The

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
4 FEBRUARY 1970

- 14 -

Hanoi broadcast reports that on 5-6 and 12 January, the PLAF twice attacked Go Su camp, Liberating 200 "compatriots." VNA on the 31st summarizes a NHAN DAN article that day which condemns the Go Su massacre and says that the poisoning of 197 inmates shows the deceit in Nixon's 25 November statement renouncing chemical warfare.

An LPA commentary on 2 February denounces U.S. "crimes" during the shelling of many cities, including Hue in February 1968. It charges that "in order to cover up their bloody hands" the allies have "noisely fabricated the so-called mass graves in Hue to distort and slander the NFLSV" and divert attention from their barbarities.*

* See the TRENDS for 28 January, page 9, for previous denials of the Hue massacre.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
4 FEBRUARY 1970

- 15 -

MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW CONTINUES TO EXPRESS HOPE FOR POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

Soviet propaganda, while evincing concern over recent Israeli military operations, hews to the position that Arab-Israeli negotiations are unacceptable under conditions which would amount to Arab capitulation and that no aspect of the Middle East problem can be settled without Israeli withdrawal. Moscow assails President Nixon's 25 January message to a conference of American Jewish leaders in Washington and his 30 January press conference remarks on the Middle East as evidence of U.S. intent to grant Israeli requests for more military assistance. Stressing the danger to peace of further such deliveries by Israel's Western patrons, Moscow attributes increased Israeli "aggression" to U.S. determination to unseat "progressive" Arab regimes. Soviet commentators continue to express the belief that a nonmilitary solution to the crisis can be achieved, based on the November 1967 Security Council resolution. But Belyayev says in the 1 February PRAVDA that the USSR's support for a political solution does not mean that it favors "appeasement at any price," and a Soviet spokesman in Cairo says there are "many aspects" to a political settlement and pledges continued "active assistance" to the Arabs.

In a speech at an international parliamentarians conference in Cairo, reported by TASS on the 3d, Soviet delegate V. Kudryavtsev says the USSR "firmly and consistently" comes out for the "speediest political settlement" of the conflict. He adds that the struggle for such a solution "has many aspects; it has a great range of means and trends and includes the task of strengthening in every way the defense potential of Arab countries, above all the countries that fell victim to the aggression." The Soviet Union, Kudryavtsev declares, has given "and will be giving active assistance and support" to the Arabs' struggle, and the struggle for a political settlement "also means giving every support to the just heroic struggle for freedom and independence waged by Arab patriots" on the occupied territories. (Arab media have been reporting for two months the imminent departure of a Palestine Liberation Organization delegation to Moscow; now Cairo radio on the 3d says fedayeen circles in Beirut have announced that PLO chairman Yasir Arafat will head a delegation to Moscow "next week.")

Since Kosygin pledged qualified support for the Palestinians in his 10 December speech, when he said that "in conditions of continuing Israeli aggression" the Soviet "people" support the just struggle of the Palestinian organizations, the few propaganda references to such support have been in the context of activities by Soviet public organizations. Thus TASS and Radio Moscow in Arabic in mid-December reported the Soviet delegation to a WPC meeting in Khartoum as declaring that Soviet public organizations decided to allocate necessary funds from the Soviet "defense of peace fund" to help the Palestinian Arabs' struggle.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS
4 FEBRUARY 1970

- 16 -

U.S. POLICY In the second half of January the U.S. proposals for a Middle East settlement drew diminished attention in Soviet propaganda. Other than the Maksimov PRAVDA article on the 27th,* there have been only scattered critical references. A domestic service commentary by Tyssovskiy on the 28th complained that the United States, in presenting separate proposals to the UAR and Jordan at the time when preparations were under way for the Arab summit conference in Rabat, "tried to create the impression that these documents were allegedly agreed upon with the Soviet Union" and that therefore a summit conference was unnecessary. This "falsification," he said, was soon exposed by the Arab countries.

Currently, the most critical comment on U.S. policy appears in foreign-language commentaries by Tsoppi, one of the more prolific propagandists on the Middle East. On 2 February he expresses concern over the "greatly intensified and broadened scope" of the Israeli "armed provocations" and declares that "the fate not only of the Middle East but of the whole world depends on whether a nonmilitary solution to the situation is possible. (In a 30 January commentary, Tsoppi had observed that a new war in the Middle East might also "embrace other regions of the world.") He charges that "American meddling" in the conflict "on Israel's side" has entered a new phase in which the United States "now openly declares its political and military alliance with the aggressors." Tsoppi asserts that President Nixon, in his 30 January press conference, "actually issued an ultimatum to the Arab countries" in saying that within 30 days the United States would examine and "satisfy" Israel's request for more arms. This, he says, is an "open threat to the Arab countries," which must either capitulate to Israel or face Israel's "offensive military potential increased several times over." In a commentary on 28 January, Tsoppi characterized the President's message to the Jewish leaders' conference as a "declaration of the war" the United States has in fact long been waging against the Arab countries.

THE USSR'S PROPOSALS The 2 February Tsoppi commentary says the USSR still holds that present tensions can be removed by nonmilitary means, and it points to the "realistic feasible proposals" made by the Soviet Union at the bilateral and four-power talks on the Middle East. Tsoppi describes the Soviet plan as "comprehensive" and stresses the idea that Israeli withdrawal "could be tied with the termination of the war" between Israel and the Arabs. In the only other propaganda

* Discussed in the 28 January issue of the TRENDS. Maksimov's article specifically identified various elements of the Soviet proposals for a Middle East settlement for the first time in Soviet mass propaganda.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
4 FEBRUARY 1970

- 17 -

reference to the Soviet proposals since they were outlined in the 27 January Maksimov article, Belyayev in the 3 February PRAVDA, reiterating that the "real basis" for a political settlement is the November 1967 Security Council resolution, goes on to say that the Soviet proposals "are being favorably regarded" in many Arab countries and in those countries really interested in a peaceful solution.

Moscow does not acknowledge the Kosygin notes to the United States on the 31st and to Britain and France on the 2d, but the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) on the 4th cites the Cairo AL-AHRAM as saying that Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov gave Nasir a copy of the message. On the 3d MENA reports "reliable informed sources" in London as saying that the notes, "drafted in extremely strong terms bordering on an ultimatum," warned that unless the four powers take serious, effective, coordinated action to end Israeli "aggression," the Soviet Union "will find it necessary to take unilateral action on its own responsibility to end the aggression."

ARMS ISSUE Soviet propaganda currently contains several references to Soviet assistance to the Arabs for strengthening their "defense capacity," ranging from assurances that such support will continue to reiteration of the rationale advanced by Kosygin in his July 1968 Stockholm press conference--that arms to the "victims of the aggression" are "just" deliveries, whereas arming Israel means arming the "aggressor." A Tsoppi foreign-language commentary on the 28th maintains defensively that the Arab countries would not have needed to strengthen their "defensive capacity," nor would the Soviet Union have needed "to help the Arab countries with its armaments," had it not been for the June 1967 "aggression" and "threats of a repetition at the present time," and had Israel and "imperialism" not blocked implementation of the November 1967 Security Council resolution and "torpedoed" a negotiated settlement.

A TRUD article on 3 February, referring to President Nixon's press conference statement that a decision on Israel's arms request would be adopted in the next 30 days, claims that the President, "trying to justify military support for the aggressor," emphasized that the United States "allegedly is only trying to 'preserve the balance of power'" in the Middle East. Belyayev's 1 February PRAVDA article says that the United States, viewing the French decision to sell Mirage fighters to Libya as upsetting the military balance in the region, "considers itself to be free of any restrictions" in supporting Israel. France's decision to maintain its arms embargo in the Middle East is welcomed in a 30 January PRAVDA article by Yermakov, who observes that pressure on France to change its "independent" Middle East policy proved unsuccessful but warns that further

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
4 FEBRUARY 1970

- 18 -

such attempts should be expected. TASS on 31 January, reporting the President's press conference, notes that he expressed concern over the French decision to deliver military aircraft to Libya and announced his intention to discuss U.S.-French differences on Middle East policy during President Pompidou's forthcoming visit to Washington.

Soviet media have made no reference to an arms embargo in the Middle East since 1 December, when an Arabic-language commentary recalled the statement in Gromyko's 20 September UNGA address that the Soviet Government had told the U.S. Government that discussion of such a question could be of no use while Israeli troops are occupying Arab territory.

USSR SAYS ARABS "EFFECTIVELY" COUNTERING ISRAELI ATTACKS

For both foreign and domestic audiences, Soviet media continue to report Israeli raids on internal UAR targets and "densely populated regions" in pursuit of military, political, and psychological aims, as well as Israeli actions against Syria and Jordan. Moscow propaganda depicts the Egyptians as retaliating successfully on Israeli positions along the Suez Canal and in Sinai; it insists that civilian casualties in the UAR have not only failed to achieve the Israeli objective of "shaking President Nasir's image," but on the contrary have helped consolidate the Egyptian people's unity.

Beyond the routine claims of growing Arab "rebuffs" to Israel that have been appearing in the propaganda for some months, there are now reminders to the Israelis that the Arabs may respond in kind: A domestic service commentary by Ryzhikov on the 3d says the Syrian flight over Haifa "showed all those who needed to be shown that Israel has no deep rearguard that is inaccessible for retaliatory bombing raids." And the domestic service on the 4th airs Cairo correspondent Rassadin's observation that Israeli aircraft have "started to bomb civilian objectives in the UAR more frequently, forgetting how vulnerable Israeli towns are." In the present circumstances, Rassadin says, it would be ridiculous to expect the Arabs to sit with folded arms; relying on "the help of their friends, they are strengthening their armed forces" and making effective counterattacks. Glukhov claims in PRAVDA on 1 February that "the element of surprise, on which the Israeli militarists were gambling, has disappeared." He asserts that the overflight of Haifa and Egyptian air strikes in Sinai "have shown that the Israeli positions are vulnerable and aggressive actions do not go unpunished."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
4 FEBRUARY 1970

- 19 -

A 30 January RED STAR article, broadcast to Arab audiences, is specific about Israeli military targets--Egyptian "air defense means," such as launching positions of ground-to-air missiles, radar installations, and antiaircraft artillery positions--as well as "deep" Egyptian targets. Among other objectives, RED STAR says, the raids are aimed at warning Cairo that the "whole Egyptian military system is a potential target for bombing."

CHOU MESSAGE TO NASIR PLEDGES PRC SUPPORT FOR ARABS

A Chou En-lai message of support to Nasir, carried by NCNA on 2 February, is the first such official Chinese pledge of support for the Arabs to be publicized in PRC media since the June 1967 war. NCNA reports that Chou received the UAR ambassador on the 2d and during a "cordial and friendly talk" handed him a letter for Nasir expressing the Chinese people's concern for the Arab struggle and pledging to remain "the most reliable friend" of the people of the UAR, "Palestine, and other Arab countries."

Chou's message takes note of the recent "fresh series of military attacks" on the UAR and other Arab countries by Israel, citing the 22 January action on Shadwan Island and adding that on 25 January President Nixon "openly declared that the United States would supply more arms to Israel to fight the Arabs." The message calls the Arab struggle part of the worldwide anti-imperialist struggle and expresses the conviction that the Arabs, through arduous and "protracted struggle," will defeat the "U.S. and Israeli aggressors."

Chou does not use the occasion to assail the Soviet "social imperialists" for colluding with "U.S. imperialism" to suppress the Palestinian armed struggle; the last such attack had appeared in a 7 January PEOPLE'S DAILY commentary reviewing the "brilliant successes" of the Palestinian guerrillas over the past year. Peking has continued routinely to report Palestinian communiques on fedayeen operations and to depict the Palestinians as inspired by Mao's teachings on armed struggle. NCNA on 26 December, reporting the closing of the Arab summit conference in Rabat, had cited PLO chairman Arafat as declaring that China stands firmly with the Palestinian people and that "our relations with China are being strengthened day by day."

Following up the Chou message, an NCNA commentary on 4 February levels a vituperative attack at the U.S. Administration, and President Nixon personally, for "backing Israel in its aggression" while "hypocritically" declaring that the United States has counseled restraint on both sides. "It is Nixon"--a "hangman whose hands are stained with the blood of the Arab people"--who instigated Israel to launch its recent "barbarous"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
4 FEBRUARY 1970

- 20 -

attacks, says NCNA, and it is he who has equipped the Israeli forces and "has sent military personnel to join Israel in massacring the Arab people."

BACKGROUND Peking has issued no formal statements on the Middle East since the period surrounding the June 1967 war, which was marked with PRC Government statements of 27 May and 6 June. Also on 6 June 1967, Chou offered "firm support" to the Arab cause in messages to Nasir, Syrian President al-Atasi, and the then PLO chairman ash-Shuqayri. Support pledges were also made in the two government statements, the second going somewhat beyond the first in declaring vaguely that the Chinese people "will not allow the U.S. imperialists and their collaborators to ride roughshod and commit aggression everywhere."

There is no indication from either Cairo or Peking media that Chou sent Nasir a message in 1967 on the UAR's 23 July revolution anniversary. MENA--but not Peking sources--reported such a message on the 1968 anniversary in which Chou reaffirmed the Chinese people's "full support" for the UAR people's "just struggle against imperialism and neocolonialism" and their wish for Arab victory in the struggle against "the aggression of U.S. imperialism and its tool, Israel." Again in 1969, MENA was the only source to report anniversary congratulations to Nasir in which Chou declared that the Chinese people "strongly support" the people of the UAR, the Palestinian people, and the rest of the Arab peoples in their struggle against "U.S. imperialism and Zionism."

MOSCOW ON Soviet propaganda has virtually ignored Peking's
PRC STANCE Middle East policies since the early fall of 1969. In September there were complaints that Peking was trying to drive a wedge between the Arab countries and split the "liberation movement." And in July and August Moscow accused Peking of trying to sabotage a political settlement in the Middle East and of "hampering Soviet efforts in this connection." A panelist in the Moscow domestic service commentators' roundtable on 20 July acknowledged Chinese charges of Soviet-American collusion in "hatching a Munich agreement for the Middle East" and in preparing some kind of deal behind the backs of the Arabs. The panelist went on to underline--as did a Moscow broadcast in Arabic in late August--the importance of Soviet military and political assistance in "stopping the Israeli aggressors" and maintaining the "progressive" Arab regimes.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
4 FEBRUARY 1970

- 21 -

Broadcasts in Turkish and Persian in August also warned of the dangers of Peking's Middle East policy. A broadcast for Turkish listeners on 12 August, claiming that Peking has called on the Arabs to sacrifice 10 million people to achieve victory, warned that other countries, including Turkey, would be harmed by a "huge war which Peking wishes to incite in the Middle East." The broadcast recalled that in 1965, when receiving an Arab delegation, Mao had "indicated that he considered the Middle East an advanced bastion for the establishment of Chinese hegemony in Asia" and that Peking had "established contact with certain adventure-seeking politicians" such as former PLO head ash-Shuqayri. Similarly, the Persian-language broadcast on 25 August asserted that in order to implement their adventurist policy, the Chinese leaders "are prepared to see the total destruction of the populations" of such countries as Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
4 FEBRUARY 1970

- 22 -

STRATEGIC ARMS

MOSCOW CONTINUES ATTACKS ON ABM'S, SOFTPEDALS SALT ISSUES

Soviet propaganda sustains its low-key campaign against Administration plans for proceeding with deployment of the Safeguard system, citing ABM deployment as one of the items in a "huge" defense budget which contributes to the inflationary spiral in the United States and the cutback in needed social programs. At the same time, Soviet commentators continue to warn of the broader consequences of going forward with Safeguard.

A foreign-language commentary by Shakhov on 2 February, pegged to President Nixon's 30 January press conference remarks on plans for the first and second phases of the system, says deployment "will be a stimulus for another round of the arms race, will lead to an exacerbation of international tension, and will enhance the dangers to world peace." (A brief 31 January domestic service report of the press conference had noted the President stated that the Administration has decided to proceed with Safeguard; the report added that, "in other words, Washington will carry the arms race, which is the main reason for the serious difficulties in the U.S. economy, even further.")

The Shakhov commentary goes on to note that while ABM's could be used in the United States as a protection for ICBM pads, their use in Vietnam or the Middle East would make them offensive weapons. "Thus behind the smokescreen of the Safeguard program the manufacture of short- and medium-range nuclear missiles will be carried out rapidly," Shakhov concludes. The Shakhov commentary does not mention possible consequences of ABM deployment for disarmament, but IZVESTIYA's Matveyev, in an article in that paper the day before the President's press conference, described the outcome of the U.S. domestic "struggle" over Safeguard as important "for prospects in the field of disarmament." Matveyev did not mention the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT), scheduled to resume in Vienna on 16 April.

A 4 February TASS dispatch reports without comment Senator Mansfield's observation that the deployment of Safeguard "may have a negative effect" on SALT. The item further reports that Senator Gore has voiced concern that the building of the Safeguard system as well as the stepped-up production of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV) "hardly contribute to limiting the strategic arms race."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

4 FEBRUARY 1970

- 23 -

While the mass propaganda currently devotes minimal attention to SALT, an article in the first issue of the new Soviet journal, THE USA--ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY, treats the negotiations at some length. As summarized by TASS on 3 February, the article contrasts the U.S. and Soviet approaches to disarmament questions, stressing that the opposition of the military-industrial complex and the traditions of a "policy of strength" are obstacles in the way of strategic arms limitation. It says that the outcome of the negotiations depends not only on the bilateral discussions at the conference hall, but also "on the struggle among supporters and adversaries" of an agreement in the United States in the period between Helsinki and Vienna. According to TASS, the journal notes editorially that the article went to press before Defense Secretary Laird made "statements in which he demanded allocations for new systems of weapons under the pretext of a 'Soviet menace.' These statements show again how well grounded are the doubts about the position of the United States" on strategic arms limitation, it adds.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

4 FEBRUARY 1970

- 24 -

SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

PEKING COMMENT ON STATE OF UNION ADDRESS AVOIDS ISSUES

In Peking's first, belated reaction to President Nixon's 22 January State of the Union address, an NCNA commentary dated 31 January portrays the speech as a confession that the United States faces a "terrible mess" at home and abroad and that it is "fast declining" as a world power, though it will not relinquish its "aggressive undertakings." NCNA ignores the President's remarks on Vietnam and Sino-U.S. relations, while stressing the role of Japan in the Administration's "aggressive schemes" in Asia and taking note of the President's expressed hope for a new relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Peking's care in keeping the record open on key Sino-U.S. issues, at a time when the Warsaw talks have been renewed, is similar to its approach at the time of the presidential inauguration last year. It was not until after cancellation of the scheduled Warsaw meeting last February that Peking began to define an intransigent position on such issues. As for the Soviet-U.S. relationship--a major theme in comment last year on the inauguration--Chinese suspicion is again in evidence in the NCNA commentary's claim that the President is determined to pursue the ambitions of the United States and the Soviet Union to "dominate and divide" the world. In taking care now not to foreclose its options toward the United States, Peking may be seeking to acquire leverage in the evolving triangular relationship among the three powers.

NCNA's treatment of the President's discussion of the Guam doctrine reflects Peking's recent preoccupation with Japan's role as a U.S. "tool for suppressing and enslaving the Asian peoples." Citing the President's remarks on Japanese-American cooperation as the linchpin for peace in the Pacific, the commentary calls for "the greatest vigilance" of the Asian peoples against this development.

While ignored in the NCNA commentary on the State of the Union address, the Vietnam and Sino-U.S. questions have been kept alive in Peking media. In addition to comment pegged to the Vietnam Workers Party anniversary, an NCNA dispatch on 3 February summarized a commentary on the President's speech by Hanoi's NHAN DAN which addressed itself to his remarks on Vietnam. There has also been another reminder of the Taiwan question, with NCNA on 2 February carrying a report on oppression of peasants on Taiwan and on the spreading "flames of resistance" against "the U.S.-Chiang gang." NCNA has carried three reports of this sort since 20 January.

Peking has not reported the President's 30 January press conference in which he announced a new phase in ABM construction to guard against a PRC nuclear capability.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
4 FEBRUARY 1970

- 25 -

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

PEKING ASSAILS SOVIET LEADERS AS MOSCOW POLEMICS ABATE

While Soviet comment on China has leveled off to a low volume of routine sniping at Peking's policies, the Chinese have broken their recent silence on Soviet affairs by raising two sensitive issues and making sharp attacks on the Soviet leadership, including personal slaps at Brezhnev. Bilateral relations have been largely ignored, though the Soviet weekly LIFE ABROAD (No. 5, not yet available but summarized by TANYUG on 31 January) accused the PRC of heightening tension along the border while renewing contacts with the United States in Warsaw. The Soviet stand on the conflict was approved by an AUCCTU plenum resolution which, according to TRUD on 29 January, declared Moscow's policy to be a combination of efforts to restore links with the PRC and "a firm rebuff to all possible provocations"--a formulation similar to the line taken by Moscow before the Peking talks.

PEKING In the past week Peking has launched provocative attacks on Soviet policies in the sensitive matters of Czechoslovakia and Vietnam--central issues in past Chinese polemical campaigns against Moscow. An NCNA report on 30 January, pegged to the first anniversary of a Czechoslovak student's self-immolation in protest against the Soviet invasion, plays up signs of resistance to "the Soviet revisionist new tsars" and echoes Peking's New Year's Day joint editorial--which proved highly offensive to the Soviets--in attacking Brezhnev by name. While reproaching "the Czechoslovak revisionist clique" for its repressive policies, the report emphasizes that it is Moscow which is pulling the strings.

A blistering attack on the Soviet leadership is contained in a 3 February PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 40th anniversary of the Vietnam Workers Party. Reviving the charge of a Soviet sellout of the Vietnamese communists, the editorial charges that "Brezhnev and his ilk," even more than Khrushchev, have sought to make deals with the United States in order to betray the Vietnamese revolution. This attack flies in the face of Hanoi's renewed appeal, in Le Duan's keynote anniversary speech, for a restoration of unity in the communist movement--the plea contained in Ho's testament and played up by Moscow.

MOSCOW Soviet coverage of China has all but disappeared from the Moscow daily press, while the weeklies continue to address themselves to the Chinese war preparations campaign. In the only article in the daily press devoted to China in the past week, IZVESTIYA on 29 January cited a U.S. correspondent's report on the PRC's purchase and stockpiling of materials which "would be vitally essential in the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

- 26 -

4 FEBRUARY 1970

event of a big war." A theoretical article in RED STAR on the same day took a passing shot at "Maoist propaganda" as being "permeated with hatred" for the Soviets.

The weekly LITERARY GAZETTE No. 5 (28 January) and the aforementioned issue of LIFE ABROAD both take note of the Chinese war preparations and link Peking's anti-Soviet activities with the Sino-U.S. talks in Warsaw. In the same period, NEW TIMES No. 5 carried an abridged version of a 23 January article in the Hungarian NEPSZABADSAG which raised the possibility of another anti-Soviet provocation by the Chinese.

In its broadcasts beamed to China, Moscow continues to level scattershot attacks on Peking's domestic and foreign policies. A Mandarin commentary over Radio Peace and Progress on 3 February promptly takes exception to the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial of that day for spreading "blatant anti-Soviet concoctions" that Moscow is sabotaging the Vietnamese cause. After defending the Soviet role in the Vietnam conflict, the commentary observes that the Chinese did not include the anti-Soviet charges in their message to the North Vietnamese on the anniversary.

Other broadcasts in Mandarin accuse the Peking leaders of colluding with imperialists by meeting with the United States in Warsaw and by purchasing war-related materials from the firms of capitalist countries. A broadcast on 27 January points to the "coincidence" of the resumption of the Warsaw talks with anti-Soviet attacks in the Chinese press. Indirectly, quoting the 23 January NEPSZABADSAG article, this broadcast acknowledges for the first time in monitored Soviet media the fact that Peking's anti-Soviet activity subsided for a time after the 11 September Kosygin-Chou meeting. The commentary also contains one of Moscow's infrequent mentions of the 1969 border incidents, citing NEPSZABADSAG for a report that propaganda films on those incidents are again being shown in Chinese theaters.

The broadcasts to China again decry allegations about a Soviet threat. But Chinese listeners are implicitly reminded of Soviet nuclear prowess in a commentary on 2 February ostensibly justifying Soviet disarmament policies. The commentary denounces "madmen" who, "showing off their nuclear strength" and "fanning up war psychosis," are ignoring the devastating effects of nuclear weapons which "are capable of wiping out the distinction between the front and the rear and of turning broad areas of the earth into barren lands within a few hours."

Taking issue with Peking's polemical reading of the 1960's in its New Year's Day joint editorial, a commentary broadcast in Mandarin on 29 January rubs in the isolation the Chinese incurred as a result of their intransigent stance in the communist movement. The commentary cites the Japan Communist Party as an example of a party which was once

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 27 -

FBIS TRENDS

4 FEBRUARY 1970

receptive toward Peking's doctrines but which has since repudiated the Chinese line. Underscoring its point, the commentary observes that now only the Albanians "blindly follow" Peking's line.

Soviet broadcasts in PRC minority languages persist in efforts to fan opposition to Peking's nationalities policies toward the Mongols, Uighurs, Kazakhs, Tibetans, and other minorities. Commentaries in these languages accuse the Chinese leaders of stepping up anti-Soviet provocations and promoting war hysteria in regions bordering on the Soviet Union in order to mask the "forcible assimilation" or "extermination" of all the non-Han peoples in China--policies said to be effected by destroying national heritages, resettling "millions of Chinese" in national regions, and militarizing "all aspects of life in the national regions of China."

CENTRAL ASIAN MILITARY DISTRICT HOLDS FIRST PARTY CONFERENCE

With an agenda including measures "to further raise the district forces' combat readiness," the first party conference of the recently created Central Asian Military District--first revealed in Soviet media reports in early November 1969 as having jurisdiction over territory contiguous with the tense Sinkiang border--is reported by the Alma-Ata domestic service on 3 February to have convened on that date. The conference heard reports delivered by the Central Asian Military District commander, Gen N. G. Lyashchenko, who formerly commanded the old Turkestan Military District from which the new district was formed, and by the first and second secretaries of the Kirgiz and Kazakh party central committees, respectively.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
FEBRUARY 1970

- 28 -

PRC AND NORTH KOREA

PEKING PUBLICIZES SINO-KOREAN BORDER NAVIGATION TALKS

NCNA reports on 30 January that a meeting of the Sino-Korean Navigation and Shipping Cooperation Committee on the Yalu and Tumen Rivers held its ninth meeting in Shenyang from 29 December to 29 January and signed a cooperation agreement after discussion "in a friendly atmosphere." KCNA carries a similar report on 3 February. The Sino-Korean Border River Navigation Cooperation Agreement had been signed on 23 May 1960, according to NCNA at the time, and subsequent meetings of the committee were reported by Peking through the fifth session in December 1965. NCNA's publicity for the current meeting, apparently the first one to be reported in PRC media since that time, appears to mark another step in Peking's effort to break out of its self-imposed isolation.*

There have been signs of improved Sino-Korean relations since the Peking meeting between Kosygin and Chou En-lai last September. Strains in relations between the two countries since the summer of 1966, when Pyongyang forcefully reasserted its independent ideological line, had culminated in rumors of border clashes in the spring of 1969 at about the time of the Sino-Soviet clashes along the Ussuri River. Presumably gratified at the Kosygin-Chou meeting, which marked a defusing of the border situation and raised hopes of a reconciliation between the DPRK's two giant neighbors, Pyongyang sent the ranking foreign delegation--led by DPRK President Choe Yong-kon--to the 1 October PRC National Day observances. Peking in turn displayed some consideration of Pyongyang's sensitivity to references to the Sino-Soviet confrontation. The anti-Soviet slogan used in ceremonies involving the North Koreans differed from that used at ceremonies for other delegations: instead of the slogan "Down with social imperialism!", NCNA's reports quoted a slogan reading "Down with modern revisionism!" Although Pyongyang avoids references to the conflict between its neighbors, it does take a hard line on "revisionism."

Restoration of correct party relations was indicated by the 8 October 1969 message from Kim Il-song and Choe Yong-kon to Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao, and Chou En-lai on the latest Chinese nuclear test. This was the first greeting from Kim Il-song on such a test since May 1966, and the fact that it was addressed to Mao marked a departure from Pyongyang's practice over the preceding few years. Kim's 30 September message on PRC National Day, only a week before the message on the test, was addressed only to Chou En-lai. The last national day message addressed to Mao was in 1966.

* Neither Peking nor Pyongyang is known to have reported a railway agreement signed on 17 December by the Soviet Union, the PRC, the DRV, the DPRK, and the MPR. A TASS report pointed out that the last such meeting on railway cooperation was held in 1966.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
4 FEBRUARY 1970

- 29 -

COMMUNIST CHINA

KWANGTUNG PROVINCE TAKES LEAD IN CCP RECONSTRUCTION

Kwangtung Province seems to have superseded Hunan, at least temporarily, as bellwether for the CCP reconstruction movement. On 1 February Canton radio reported that a municipal CCP committee had been established in Maoming--a lesser Kwangtung city, but nonetheless the first new city party committee reported in the nation. So far, as in the prior example of Hunan's new county party committees, also the first of their type to be reported, this development has not been publicized by Peking.

On 1 February Peking did report on activities of the CCP core group of the Kwangtung Provincial Revolutionary Committee. This is the first known reference in official central media to a party core group at the provincial level since 1967. There have been a few local radio references in recent weeks to provincial-level core groups for Inner Mongolia and Shantung.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
4 FEBRUARY 1970

- 30 -

USSR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA

MOSCOW FRONTPAGES POLITICAL DEMISE OF DUBCEK AND CERNIK

The 30 January PRAVDA carries on page one the CPCZ plenum's announcement of personnel changes including the resignation of Alexander Dubcek from the Central Committee and the removal of his liberal colleague Oldrich Cernik as premier and member of the party Presidium.

Last September, PRAVDA had carried on an inside page the CPCZ plenum's expulsion of Dubcek from the Presidium and Josef Smrkovsky from the Central Committee. A "friendly" visit paid by Cernik to Warsaw barely three weeks before his ouster--a visit given conspicuously lavish treatment in Polish media--had drawn minimal Soviet attention and restrained coverage from Prague.

Comment from Moscow and its European bloc allies generally avoids the specifics of the latest personnel changes. PRAVDA's international review by Belyayev on 1 February welcomes the plenum's personnel shifts and economic measures as "strengthening the positions of socialism" and the party's leading role against the "rightwing" forces. The East German Deutschlandsender's Prague correspondent on the 2d, however, testily defends the plenum changes against Western press "fury," pointing out that Cernik has been given another ministerial job (technological development and investments) "in accordance with his economic experience." The GDR correspondent disposes of Dubcek with the remark that "some Central Committee members left" that body "at their own request because they realized that their attitude in the past did not measure up to Marxist-Leninist principles."

Kosygin and his counterparts in the European communist countries, including Romania's Maurer, promptly dispatched messages of congratulations to Cernik's conservative successor, Lubomir Strougal.

HUSAK REPORT Moscow's treatment of the report by Gustav Husak at the plenum's concluding session on 30 January further reflects the Soviet leaders' unenthusiastic acceptance of the erstwhile Slovak martyr as the best available choice--at least at this juncture--to keep a rein on the nationwide popular hostility to the occupiers and their proteges. Thus PRAVDA again refrains from carrying Husak's plenum speech in full, devoting a quarter of a page to the speech in the 31 January issue. PRAVDA had devoted almost two full pages to the CPCZ First Secretary's September plenum speech, which was only about twice as long as the present one. TASS on 30 January and PRAVDA the next day predictably highlight Husak's claim of past successes against the rightists and his warning that "this does not mean that these forces

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

4 FEBRUARY 1970

- 31 -

no longer exist, that they do not resort to other methods." They also feature Husak's defensive references to charges by "Western propaganda and deserters" that "certain ultraconservative forces exist" in the country and "are bringing pressure on us, on me, and try to establish a police regime or terror."

While duly reporting Husak's remarks ruling out a "return to the fifties," the Soviet reports do not include his repeated pleas, at the windup of the speech, for a "sensitive approach" to "win over" the artistic and technical intelligentsia "and not just mechanically condemn, label, and eliminate" them "in any manner."

FEDERATION The Soviet reports also feature remarks by Husak that pointedly downgrade the federative system in the country, which had been a principal goal of the liberal April 1968 party program and was implemented some four months after the occupation, on 1 January 1969. The Soviet reports quote Husak to the effect that while the federative system--full-scale governments and separate communist party entities for the Czech lands and Slovakia--has proved to be "correct," the role of "the unifying force is played above all by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the single party which is guided by the single party committee and has the single program and goals." Husak also said, in the textual version carried in the Prague domestic service, that "in some respects, things have gone too far" and that there is a need to "correct these mistakes" and "strengthen the federal center." He added that "certain federative elements have gotten into our party," and he stressed the past role of the Czech party bureau--heretofore headed by the new premier, Strougal--and the Slovak Communist Party as a prelude to a call for changes "in the new situation."

JOZEF LENART The three CPCZ Presidium positions vacated by Cernik, trade union leader Polacek, and Slovak party First Secretary Sadovsky are taken by conservatives Antonin Kapek, Josef Korcak, and Jozef Lenart--who also replaces the evidently no less conservative Sadovsky as head of the Slovak party. The present shift appears to mark the full political comeback of Lenart, who had been Novotny's "moderate" choice to succeed the Stalinist figure Siroky as CSSR Premier in 1963 but lost this position to Cernik in April 1968 and was downgraded from full to alternate Presidium member at the same time. He had remained an alternate Presidium member and party secretary both before and since the August 1968 occupation.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

4 FEBRUARY 1970

- 32 -

ROMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA

BUCHAREST DISCLAIMS "NATIONALISM," DEFENDS TIES WITH WEST

A lengthy article in the February issue of LUPTA DE CLASA, the theoretical organ of the Romanian CP Central Committee, is the sharpest and most detailed rebuttal of the Soviet view of relations between socialist countries to appear in Bucharest media in recent months. As summarized by Radio Bucharest on 2 February, the article does not name the Soviet Union but transparently rejects the Soviet stand on the dangers of nationalism and Western bridgebuilding and vigorously defends Romania's right to economic and political autonomy, particularly in its developing relations with the West. The article appears against the background of Moscow's efforts to line up support for its foreign policy views in conjunction with the propaganda drive for a European security conference, and may be reactive to Soviet pressures on Romania to conform to those views. It also appears on the eve of the French Communist Party Congress, where socialist relations and the sensitive issue of Czechoslovakia are expected to come up for discussion.

In effect rejecting the Soviet argument that national interests of socialist countries are subordinate to the class interests of socialism, the LUPTA DE CLASA article stresses: "There is no national and international communism, and any delimitation in this field is artificial and unscientific; the national and international character of communism is an organic, dialectic whole." It adds that "it is entirely erroneous and antiscientific" to attribute the meaning of nationalism to the efforts of a people to develop their own country with their own forces in a spirit of cooperation with others.

Noting a tendency in "some works published abroad" to discern a conflict between national and international interests, the article argues that such opposition develops only when one country tries to dominate another and to promote its own development "at the expense of another." Thus, it concludes, "internationalism does not presuppose the renunciation of national interests, because the interstate relations based on such renunciation would not be internationalism but subordination."

In what may be in part a response to Soviet pressures on Romania to take part in supranational planning in CEMA and to go slowly in pushing its economic ties with the West, particularly with Bonn, LUPTA DE CLASA observes that although Romania is interested in further economic cooperation with the socialist countries, socialism "excludes the economic domination of one people by another and objectively presupposes the elimination of links that would be disadvantageous to one of

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

- 33 -

14 FEBRUARY 1970

the partners, or that would create and perpetuate inequality of an economic, social, and political nature."

The article defends Romania's right to develop relations with the West, saying life has shown that "the development of ties with the capitalist world does not imply the restoration of capitalism"--a possible allusion to Moscow's own relations with the Western countries. On the contrary, the journal says, such ties contribute to implementation of the economic objectives of the socialist countries. The journal also dismisses the idea that Western bridgebuilding endangers East European communism: "The peoples of the socialist countries have confidence in their system, and it is absurd to believe that they could lose their revolutionary gains as a consequence of bourgeois, anticommunist propaganda, no matter how subtle it may be." Thus rejecting Soviet propaganda charges about the dangers of Western penetration of Eastern Europe, the article seems contrived in large part to undercut the Soviet rationale that a stronger CEMA and Warsaw Pact are needed to combat an "imperialist" threat.

YUGOSLAV COMMENTATOR ASSAILS LIMITED SOVEREIGNTY DOCTRINE

Another spirited--and far more outspoken--attack on Moscow's concept of socialist relations appears in a 31 January commentary by Radio Zagreb's Milika Sundic, who charges the Soviet press with reviving the issue of Czechoslovakia and the limited sovereignty doctrine to put pressure on other socialist states. Sundic reacts to recent Soviet press articles with a denunciation of Moscow's rationale for the intervention in Czechoslovakia--a subject that had been off limits for Yugoslav media since Gromyko's visit in the fall of 1969.

Noting that a SOVIET RUSSIA article on 29 January sought to characterize the limited sovereignty doctrine as a Western invention but in effect reaffirmed it, Sundic bluntly declares that the doctrine was created by "theoreticians and responsible statesmen whose troops intervened in Czechoslovakia in August 1968." Such theories, Sundic adds, "are unacceptable and very dangerous, and the League of Yugoslav Communists rejects them as dangerous for the unity of socialist countries and the communist and workers movement." The commentary continues: "The LCY does not recognize any internationalism which demands the renunciation of national sovereignty." Asking rhetorically why the Soviet press is raising the issue of Czechoslovakia at this time, Sundic suggests that it is being revived "as a continuous threat to others, because otherwise why should it be talked about in such a manner, when even those who are doing this know full well that it is not at all popular?"

Sundic is a free-wheeling commentator who has at times gone beyond the party line in criticizing Soviet policies. But the references to "the LCY" suggest that on this occasion he is reflecting the party's sensitivities to Soviet press attacks on nationalism and revisionism and to what the Yugoslavs may interpret as propaganda pressures on the Romanians.

CONFIDENTIAL